This is Part II of a two-part series. Read Part I.
There is far more to fog and friction that just the battlefield itself. Commanders must consider numerous variables when making decisions, many of which are not easily quantifiable. Fog and friction include intangibles such as enemy decisions, soldier morale and chance. No C4ISR system, regardless of capability, can predict outcomes. While military and civilian leaders make decisions based upon available information, they also utilize their prior experiences and intuition based upon METT-TC (Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troops and Support Available, Time Available, Civil Considerations). No system can replicate that process and arrive at the same conclusions.
Consider the historical example of the WWII German operation known as Der Wacht am Rhein (The Watch on the Rhein) in late 1944.Hitler had directed the German military to plan for a counterattack through the Ardennes to split the allies and possibly force a ceasefire. For months, the Wehrmacht moved nearly 500,000 men, 500 tanks and 1,900 artillery pieces across the Reich for the operation. Allied intelligence failed to observe the buildup, despite significant C4ISR advantages in IMINT (Imagery Intelligence), HUMINT (Human Intelligence) and SIGINT (Signals Intelligence). (William Cavanaugh (REEP, Inc.), in multiple lectures to the author during unit Battle of the Bulge staff ride, November 21-23, 2005). General George Patton, a learned student of history and of the German high command, thought otherwise. He stated that:
“There’s absolutely no reason for us to assume that the Germans are mounting a major offensive. The weather is awful and their supplies are low. The Germans haven’t mounted a winter attack since Frederick the Great. Therefore I believe that’s exactly what they are going to do.”
Patton ordered his Third Army staff to plan for three contingency operations based upon anticipated locations for the attacks. Although the German Army achieved complete surprise in the initial phase of the attack, Patton’s ability to see through the fog of war resulted in a swift counterattack through Luxembourg into Belgium that defeated the German drive. Where C4ISR failed, human intuition did not.
Chance, luck or “Murphy’s Law” has always been a factor in battle. No C4ISR system can account for how, when, where or why a battle will occur. The last days of WWII in the Pacific provide a fine example of how luck can alter the outcome of a battle, or even a war. The Japanese Emperor, Hirohito, finally agreed to surrender following the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Hirohito recorded a surrender speech to Japanese people that was to be played on national radio. The recording was entrusted to a loyal government official for safekeeping until the broadcast scheduled for the following day. A small cadre of diehard Japanese officers learned of the pending surrender, staged a coup d’etat at the Imperial Palace and immediately began searching for the recording. Fortunately, their search was thwarted by a US B-29 strike during which the Tokyo power grid was shut off. Unable to find the recording and prevent the broadcast, the coup quickly collapsed and Japan surrendered unconditionally to the Allied nations. Although the coup would not have staved off defeat, it may have deposed the Emperor and continued the war for several more months (Smith, Jim B., Malcolm McConnell, The Last Mission. New York: Broadway Books, 2002.). No C4ISR system, regardless of complexity or ability, could have accounted for the recording, the coup, the B-29 strike and the power outage.
A final reason for the validity of Clausewitz’s fog and friction in war is that our enemies do not fight in doctrinal formations on a linear battlefield. Intelligence collection reliant upon C4ISR systems (i.e., digital systems) leave sizeable gaps that must be covered via HUMINT, reconnaissance and surveillance and other human-based collection. Over-reliance upon C4ISR leaves commanders ignorant to enemy plans and moves. This was never more prevalent that during the Clinton administration which drastically reduced US HUMINT capability in favor of air and space collection assets. This resulted in US and Western strategic blindness regarding Al Qaeda’s goals and ability to conduct Islamic terrorism around the world. It was only with the election of George W. Bush to the presidency, and the events of 9/11, that HUMINT was restored to a lead role in intelligence collection.
No C4ISR system can eliminate the fog and friction of war. Clausewitz’s theories on the subject are more valid than ever today – military leaders ignore them at their own peril. Fog and friction are permanent fixtures of battle and will remain so until man ceases combat altogether. And no C4ISR system, regardless of complexity or capability, can see every facet of the battlefield or ascertain combat’s intangible aspects.
MAJ Heatherly is an active duty U.S. Army military intelligence officer with two tours in Iraq. He is currently assigned to the School of Advanced Military Studies in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the author and do not reflect those of the United States government, the Department of Defense or the United States Army.
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