If Afghanistan were at peace, the media would probably have paid scant regard to the twentieth anniversary of the Soviet withdrawl from Afghanistan. By the time that the last Red Army soldier had crossed the ironically named “Friendship Bridge” across the Amu Darya river that marked the border between the USSR and Afghanistan, the Soviet Union had lost around 15,000 troops in a war that would help to cause the country’s own disintegration two years later.
As US–led forces face another year of fierce combat operations in the restive Central Asian country, it proved irresistible for writers in Europe to draw heavy comparisons. A world superpower is locked in conflict with an elusive foe in this rugged country. Won’t the United States now go the same way as the USSR two decades before? The US won’t disintegrate, necessarily, but will it be forced to withdraw and declare defeat by the Taliban – an enemy that knows its own terrain, has popular support, and is motivated by its desire for a famous victory over a superpower?
However well-founded these comparisons may appear, are they not wrong? The Soviets ploughed in conscript soldiers with little desire to be in the country, while the United States and other NATO soldiers are professional, motivated and highly trained. The Mujahideen rebels who fought the Red Army enjoyed the support of the United States, Saudi Arabia and several other countries. The Taliban enjoy no such support. The Soviets largely eschewed efforts to get the Afghan population on its side through so-called “hearts and minds” operations. The United States and her allies have poured millions of dollars in getting schools, roads and hospitals built in a bid to win over the Afghan population. The Western forces in Afghanistan also have military technology, such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, which the Soviets could have only dreamed of. As a consequence, little can move in Afghanistan without the US or NATO’s attention, and when it does, it can be struck with lethal force.
It is always tempting to look to history for lessons, but quick conclusions can often be misguided.
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Brian King said:
The one constant between the two conflicts has been the role of Pakistan as spoiler. The US was able to use Pakistan to good effect against the Soviets as a safe haven, in much the same way as the Taliban enjoy cross-border support from the tribal regions of Pakistan today. The US/allies have nothing to worry about in regards to losing, but the definition of winning the war may never be clear. Afghanistan is a failed state with almost nothing going for it by way of “rebuilding” except the drug trade. How do you ever declare victory under such conditions?
March 11th, 2009 at 1:58 pm
RIchard Bruneau said:
The past is prologue, but not prediction. Chasing the illusion of historical “lessons” remains a dangerous preoccupation of policy makers. Far more wars and battles have been won by recognizing the unique attributes and requirements of each conflict than by attempting to fit the past into the present.Historical truth mostly resides in particulars rather than analogies and the outcome of the current battle for Afghanistan will rise or fall on its own merits. Hence the Soviet experience in Afghanistan is of only marginal relevance.
March 14th, 2009 at 4:44 pm
Gerald D. Swick said:
Or to put it another way, Richard, when History gives a quiz on the lessons it has taught, the answers are always multiple choice.
March 15th, 2009 at 8:13 am
Jon Guttman said:
During the Soviet Union’s “Vietnam,” the United States supplied clandestine aid to the Mujaheddin. The same can be said for the many secret aiders and abettors of the Taliban. Unless the Afghans can find a satisfactory alternative cash crop to opium and other homegrown drugs, we’re going to have a problem…the wild card factor of religion aside. One historic constant about Afghanistan, in common with several other countries (including Vietnam) is that the longer we stay, the more we wear out our welcome.
April 9th, 2009 at 11:42 am