Comments on: Rorke’s Drift Revisited: Lessons for the Small Unit Leader

By: John Merkatatis

John Merkatatis — Thu, 31 Dec 2009 22:37:00 +0000

Mr Howe is confusing or confused i am not sure which,terrorism and colonialism are not equated by major Heatherly,as far as I can read ;
he simply stresses the importance 0f small unit independent action when the enemy is fighting with guerilla tactics in a terrain as difficult as that of Afganistan or South Africa(savvana has its own characteristics as a difficult terrain)when disciplined action and disciplined fire coupled with initiative is all important;the example is 100% military and devoid of political implications;
In Afganistan as well as in South Africa the enemy was and is fighting on home ground and can achieve local numerical superiority for a particular action or even an ambush;the numericaly inferior unit must be able to prevent its destruction and demoralise the enemy through a given impression of invincibility,if I am allowed the expression.It is the only course for survival.

By: George Kirkwood

George Kirkwood — Mon, 21 Dec 2009 19:56:47 +0000

Commisar Dalton received belated recognition for his service and courage at Roukes Drift. Likewise, the doctor, Major Reynolds of the Army Hospital Corps, who drew his sword and fought off Zulus inside the hospital in defence of his patients even though the roof was burning above them. The small hospital was defended room by room.

By: Bill Parry

Bill Parry — Mon, 21 Dec 2009 03:42:11 +0000

Historically both Bromhead and Chard were regarded as less than brilliant by their peers, and most of the planning was carried out by Commisary Dalton, an ex soldier. While of course being Welsh I am very proud of B company (Not that as the movie states it was a Welsh regiment with some foreigners from England in it mind you), the basic feeling of the men at the time was there was no alternative but to stand and fight behind the mealie bags and biscuit boxes. The British soldier like most men in combat had no idea what the game plan was, the political aims or where they were half the time. They were sent somewhere to do a job and they did it well. The reward was exactly as stated again in the movie “Flies in your meat.. etc) while medals and praise was awarded a few. The ultimate disgrace was that they had to watch the birds hovering over Isandlawana a few miles away. The only reason those who give out the medals visited the field was to bring away the few undamaged wagons. The men of the 24th were not properly honored until a number of months after the battle. Many of the brave men of Rorke’s Drift suffered terribly due to crowding, little food and disease. After fighting for Queen and country to get their ‘Shilling’ this was their reward. Is this battle comparable to one’s today? I bloody hope not.Even so God bless all soldiers everywhere who ‘Do their bit’.

By: Don Hines

Don Hines — Wed, 16 Dec 2009 13:45:10 +0000

I totally agree with Chris Heatherly’s assessment of Mr. Howe’s comments. If you fail to even attempt to learn the lessons of history you are doomed to repeat them. That has been written time and time again over the years and proven to be correct. To not recognize that there in fact ARE parallels between the war on terror and Rorke’s Drift,and the Alamo, and Gettysburg and any major battle that you can name, is wrong thinking. Advances in technology aside, the art of leadership and the discipline to follow that leadership is as old as warfare and will never change. Those guys in Afghanistan that are forward of the main elements at those small outposts are as vulnerable as the men at Rorke’s Drift were and sometimes, even in 2009, all that stands between men and defeat is a rifle with a bayonet and the guts of the soldier behind it, apologies to Color Sergeant Bourne. And as a veteran of F Troop 17th Cavalry in Vietnam I would like to thank Mr. Heatherly for his service to our country.

By: Chris Heatherly

Chris Heatherly — Wed, 16 Dec 2009 03:53:35 +0000

Mr. Howe,
Perhaps I am a bit confused by your somewhat emotional reply, but are you implying that professional soldiers should not, or cannot, derive lessons learned from past conflicts? Clearly, one can study the battle of Rorke’s Drift to determine how and why a far smaller British force avoided a catastrophic defeat at the hands of the Zulu. As a serving soldier, I can assure you that time honored military principles, such as training or discipline, are valid in any era, in any fight and against any opponent.

By: Patrick Howe

Patrick Howe — Wed, 16 Dec 2009 01:54:20 +0000

My comments come after a visit (and terrific guided tour) of Rourke’s Drift as well as a stop (with a tour) for the better part of a day walking the battlefield of Isandlwana, where apprx 1,300 British soldiers had been wiped out the previous day. Isandlwana was a major embarrassment for the British Army and Government in this colonial period. While not taking anything away from the sheer heroism of the few British soldiers at Rourke’s Drift, it is apparent in hind sight that the glorification of this battle — awarding of a large number of VCs is but one example of this glorification — was to damp down the huge political and military disgrace among British citizens caused by this ill-advised venture against the Zulus and the absolute drubbing the British took at Isandlwana. But what is comical and non sensical is the attempt to find parallels with the tragic Afghanistan war. Get a grip! There is nothing — and I mean nothing — to connect the American-inspired NATO tactics in Afghanistan with those used by the colonially minded British in South Africa during the first Boer War. Terrorism and colonialism cannot be equated in this manner, no matter how appalling the two are.

By: Christopher

Christopher — Mon, 14 Dec 2009 09:43:48 +0000

Interesting article, but I find your supposition that they chose to defend the hospital versus facing the Zulus in the open slightly wrong. Firstly, it was a hospital, with some sick and injured people in it that were bedridden.
Secondly, they were far outnumbered, and any force so outnumbered stands little to no chance if they are not entrenched with some sort of fortification, particularly with the weapons that they had available at that time – no MG positions that could hold a line as in the Ia Drang.