On December 1st, 2009, President Barack Obama announced that an additional 30,000 soldiers will deploy to Afghanistan as part of continuing operations against radical Islamic forces attempting to overthrow the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Since the initiation of US operations against the Taliban in 2001, insurgent forces have demonstrated the ability to rapidly amass large formations and achieve local superiority against isolated US and NATO units. The enemy’s goal in these attacks is to overwhelm the defenders’ firepower and airpower advantages long enough to either overrun the unit or capture large numbers of soldiers before sufficient ground forces can respond. Should this tragedy unfold, the resulting fallout in the international media could furthermore undermine the American public’s support for continued operations in Afghanistan.
Small unit leaders would do well to remember the events of January 22-23, 1879, when a handful of British soldiers, alone and without the benefits of today’s technology, faced certain annihilation against an overwhelmingly large Zulu force. I am speaking of course of B Company, 2nd Battalion, 24th Regiment of Foot and the Battle of Rorke’s Drift in present-day South Africa. That engagement demonstrated what a properly trained and disciplined company-sized force can achieve against impossible odds. Lieutenants John Chard and Gonville Bromhead successfully defended the mission station with a force of 139 British soldiers against an estimated 4,000 to 5,000 Zulu warriors. By the battle’s end, the station was still in British hands, and the Zulus had suffered a tremendous defeat. Additionally, the British won 11 Victoria Crosses – the most ever awarded for a single engagement.
While there are certainly differences between the Battle of Rorke’s Drift and the current conflict in Afghanistan, there are a number of important lessons to be learned by small unit leaders. First and foremost is the use of intelligence platforms for the commander to develop an understanding of the battlefield, as well as the enemy’s composition, disposition and intent. Chard and Bromhead did not have access to the advanced collection platforms available today and instead relied upon human-based methods of surveillance and reconnaissance before, and after the battle. Chard ordered soldiers to summit the dominant local terrain feature, the Oskarberg, to act as an early warning listening post/observation post (LP/OP) before the battle to warn of the Zulu’s approach. A second soldier was placed atop the hospital for the same purpose. Scouts were also employed after the battle to search for stay-behind forces amongst the Zulu dead and purge the battlefield of weapons.
A great deal has been written since the start of the Global War on Terror regarding the need for soldiers to know, and more importantly understand, the culture of their adversaries. This knowledge goes well beyond the polite aspects of cultural awareness. It helps soldiers anticipate how, where, when, why and in what manner the enemy will fight. Clearly, both Chard and Bromhead were familiar with Zulu military tactics and culture that contributed to their decision to stay and defend the mission station rather than confront the Zulu force in the open plains.
Perhaps the most important lesson current soldiers can learn from Chard and Bromhead are the advantages provided by well-trained and disciplined soldiers. The soldiers of B Company were posted to an isolated location and left behind as the remainder of the regiment marched off to battle against the Zulus at Isandlawana. Rather than allow their unit to fall into complacency or a state of ill-preparedness, B Company’s leaders drilled their soldiers daily under the watchful eyes of their non-commissioned officers. These drills ensured B Company was both physically fit and proficient with their bayonet skills, both of which paid off during the Zulu’s human wave assaults. The battle raged for hours with little respite for the defenders. Lesser men would have crumbled.
B Company’s training also showed itself in the marksmanship exhibited during the engagement. Although official distances are impossible to verify, the Martini-Henry can effectively fire well beyond 1,000 yards. Post-battle assessments confirmed deadly rifle shots at over 700 yards. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the soldiers did not utilize volley fire under the direction of their superiors. The men selected and engaged targets individually – further testament to their preparation and self-control.
The United States and NATO are now entering their eighth year of combat against radical Muslim insurgents in Afghanistan. It is a given that American and allied soldiers will fight in company or smaller-sized units against an enemy that can achieve local force superiority. Those soldiers must stand ready, through superior training and iron-willed discipline, to meet that threat.
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Christopher said:
Interesting article, but I find your supposition that they chose to defend the hospital versus facing the Zulus in the open slightly wrong. Firstly, it was a hospital, with some sick and injured people in it that were bedridden.
Secondly, they were far outnumbered, and any force so outnumbered stands little to no chance if they are not entrenched with some sort of fortification, particularly with the weapons that they had available at that time – no MG positions that could hold a line as in the Ia Drang.
December 14th, 2009 at 4:43 am
Patrick Howe said:
My comments come after a visit (and terrific guided tour) of Rourke’s Drift as well as a stop (with a tour) for the better part of a day walking the battlefield of Isandlwana, where apprx 1,300 British soldiers had been wiped out the previous day. Isandlwana was a major embarrassment for the British Army and Government in this colonial period. While not taking anything away from the sheer heroism of the few British soldiers at Rourke’s Drift, it is apparent in hind sight that the glorification of this battle — awarding of a large number of VCs is but one example of this glorification — was to damp down the huge political and military disgrace among British citizens caused by this ill-advised venture against the Zulus and the absolute drubbing the British took at Isandlwana. But what is comical and non sensical is the attempt to find parallels with the tragic Afghanistan war. Get a grip! There is nothing — and I mean nothing — to connect the American-inspired NATO tactics in Afghanistan with those used by the colonially minded British in South Africa during the first Boer War. Terrorism and colonialism cannot be equated in this manner, no matter how appalling the two are.
December 15th, 2009 at 8:54 pm
Chris Heatherly said:
Mr. Howe,
Perhaps I am a bit confused by your somewhat emotional reply, but are you implying that professional soldiers should not, or cannot, derive lessons learned from past conflicts? Clearly, one can study the battle of Rorke’s Drift to determine how and why a far smaller British force avoided a catastrophic defeat at the hands of the Zulu. As a serving soldier, I can assure you that time honored military principles, such as training or discipline, are valid in any era, in any fight and against any opponent.
December 15th, 2009 at 10:53 pm
Don Hines said:
I totally agree with Chris Heatherly’s assessment of Mr. Howe’s comments. If you fail to even attempt to learn the lessons of history you are doomed to repeat them. That has been written time and time again over the years and proven to be correct. To not recognize that there in fact ARE parallels between the war on terror and Rorke’s Drift,and the Alamo, and Gettysburg and any major battle that you can name, is wrong thinking. Advances in technology aside, the art of leadership and the discipline to follow that leadership is as old as warfare and will never change. Those guys in Afghanistan that are forward of the main elements at those small outposts are as vulnerable as the men at Rorke’s Drift were and sometimes, even in 2009, all that stands between men and defeat is a rifle with a bayonet and the guts of the soldier behind it, apologies to Color Sergeant Bourne. And as a veteran of F Troop 17th Cavalry in Vietnam I would like to thank Mr. Heatherly for his service to our country.
December 16th, 2009 at 8:45 am
Bill Parry said:
Historically both Bromhead and Chard were regarded as less than brilliant by their peers, and most of the planning was carried out by Commisary Dalton, an ex soldier. While of course being Welsh I am very proud of B company (Not that as the movie states it was a Welsh regiment with some foreigners from England in it mind you), the basic feeling of the men at the time was there was no alternative but to stand and fight behind the mealie bags and biscuit boxes. The British soldier like most men in combat had no idea what the game plan was, the political aims or where they were half the time. They were sent somewhere to do a job and they did it well. The reward was exactly as stated again in the movie “Flies in your meat.. etc) while medals and praise was awarded a few. The ultimate disgrace was that they had to watch the birds hovering over Isandlawana a few miles away. The only reason those who give out the medals visited the field was to bring away the few undamaged wagons. The men of the 24th were not properly honored until a number of months after the battle. Many of the brave men of Rorke’s Drift suffered terribly due to crowding, little food and disease. After fighting for Queen and country to get their ‘Shilling’ this was their reward. Is this battle comparable to one’s today? I bloody hope not.Even so God bless all soldiers everywhere who ‘Do their bit’.
December 20th, 2009 at 10:42 pm
George Kirkwood said:
Commisar Dalton received belated recognition for his service and courage at Roukes Drift. Likewise, the doctor, Major Reynolds of the Army Hospital Corps, who drew his sword and fought off Zulus inside the hospital in defence of his patients even though the roof was burning above them. The small hospital was defended room by room.
December 21st, 2009 at 2:56 pm
John Merkatatis said:
Mr Howe is confusing or confused i am not sure which,terrorism and colonialism are not equated by major Heatherly,as far as I can read ;
he simply stresses the importance 0f small unit independent action when the enemy is fighting with guerilla tactics in a terrain as difficult as that of Afganistan or South Africa(savvana has its own characteristics as a difficult terrain)when disciplined action and disciplined fire coupled with initiative is all important;the example is 100% military and devoid of political implications;
In Afganistan as well as in South Africa the enemy was and is fighting on home ground and can achieve local numerical superiority for a particular action or even an ambush;the numericaly inferior unit must be able to prevent its destruction and demoralise the enemy through a given impression of invincibility,if I am allowed the expression.It is the only course for survival.
December 31st, 2009 at 5:37 pm