“Those who cannot remember the past are doomed to repeat it.”
- George Santayana
The American military has a long history of involvement in both insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare. The United States itself was born through revolution against an oppressive foreign government. The US Army constantly campaigned against, and sometimes with, Native American Indian tribes. In the 20th century alone, the US military fought against insurgencies in the Philippines, South Korea, Vietnam, Germany, and throughout Central and South America. Intuitively, one might expect the United States government to have a seasoned and tested formula for counterinsurgency operations.
Unfortunately, this expectation has largely been unfulfilled. With the notable exception of the Marine Corps Small Wars Manual, very few counterinsurgency and asymmetric warfare lessons learned were incorporated into doctrine. Effective counterinsurgency knowledge was rapidly forgotten once experienced soldiers or Marines left their respective services. Scant training was afforded to subsequent military or civil leaders in their professional training and education. To be sure, there were mavericks that went against the grain and understood the frequency and lethality of insurgent movements. Leaders such as General George Crook, General Leonard Wood, General Creighton Abrams and more recently General David Petraeus recognized the need to study previous counterinsurgencies, learn from them, and incorporate their lessons into current conflicts. The United States longest counterinsurgency – the American Indian Wars – provided lessons that have been incorporated into current operations under the Global War on Terror (GWOT).
At the tactical level, the Army realized that cultural awareness, or more accurately cultural understanding, was necessary for successful operations during the Indian Wars. Astute military leaders and soldiers recognized the value and benefits that cultural understanding afforded them on the battlefield. In many cases, a clear understanding between local tribes and military leaders was sufficient to prevent bloodshed – at least until political pressure forced the issue.
The Army’s solution to bridge the gaps in cultural awareness was to recruit from tribes hostile to those at war with the US government. Apart from the advantage this provided in understanding one’s enemy, the sight of “brother Indians” fighting alongside US soldiers was a significant blow to Indian morale. Indians filled two primary roles – as individual advisors to unit leaders or in composite units like the famed Apache Scouts. Period writings by Army officers and soldiers speak highly of these men and their contribution to ending the Indian Wars.
A second key component of the Army’s cultural understanding was to recognize the differences of each tribe rather than viewing Indians as a homogenous people. Apart from the obvious distinctions in language and dress, a culturally aware soldier would understand differences in the tribes’ motivation, goals, needs and fighting styles. During the Apache campaign, for example, General Benjamin Grierson knew his opponent was more mobile, lethal and adaptable to the terrain of southwest Texas and northern Mexico. Rather than waste time and resources in futile pursuit, Grierson positioned his forces at key watering points along the border and waited for Apache insurgents to come to him. This technique was highly successful in ending Apache cross-border raids and restoring a measure of stability to the region.
Sadly, the idea of cultural understanding was largely lost on the United States government in general and the Army specifically at the operational and strategic levels. Senior officials and officers, safely ensconced in D.C., held the view that “an Indian is an Indian is an Indian.” Key differences and commonalities between tribes were ignored in policy making. An erroneous common belief of Washington leaders was that they knew what was best for the Indians. Both of these erroneous views led directly to tremendously flawed policy making for the Army in the field. Little wonder that American-Indian relations were fraught with fear, mistrust and violence.
The requirement for cultural understanding was not lost to history, however, and is a key factor in the Global War on Terror. True, the GWOT has witnessed a handful of critical failures including prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, Koran desecration and the like. Despite these highly publicized instances, the Army has made tremendous strides in cultural understanding at all levels. Officers attending the Command and General Staff College are required to take language training appropriate to their future area of assignment. Regional-specific culture classes are provided to every soldier deploying into operational theaters. This training goes far beyond polite manners and focuses more upon the core cultural identity, needs and motivation of enemies, allies and neutrals.
This is Part I of a two-part series. Part II will examine the necessity of a “total government” approach.
MAJ Heatherly is an active duty U.S. Army military intelligence officer with two tours in Iraq. He is currently assigned to the School of Advanced Military Studies in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the author and do not reflect those of the United States government, the Department of Defense or the United States Army.
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